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Abstract
We study algorithms to compute the Shapley value for a cooperative game on a lattice
LΣ = (FΣ,⊆) where FΣ is the family of closed sets given by an implicational system Σ on
a set N of players. The first algorithm is based on the generation of the maximal chains of
the lattice LΣ and computes the Shapley value in O(|N |3.|Σ|.|Ch|) time complexity using
polynomial space, where Ch is the set of maximal chains of LΣ. The second algorithm
proceeds by building the lattice LΣ and computes the Shapley value in O(|N |3.|Σ|.|FΣ|)
time and space complexity. Our main contribution is to show that the Shapley value of
weighted graph games on a product of chains with the same fixed length is computable in
polynomial time. We do this by partitioning the set of feasible coalitions relevant to the
computation of the Shapley value into equivalence classes in such a way that we need to
consider only one element of each class in the computation.
Keywords: Cooperative game - Restricted cooperation - Lattice - Shapley value.
1. Introduction
The Shapley value [27] is one of the most popular solution concepts in the theory
of cooperative games. It reflects the intuitive notion of fairness in the division of the
output generated by a coalition of players. The Shapley value has been used in a wide
range of applications such as clustering [14], congestion games [18] and network centrality
[21]. Thus, the challenging task of computing the Shapley value has been one of the main
concerns of researchers and practitioners in cooperative games. Most of the effort that
has been prodigated to solve this issue deals with classical cooperative games i.e games
where the set of feasible coalitions is the boolean lattice. In practice, however, not all the
coalitions are feasible. For example, the feasible coalitions may be determined by linguistic
or geographical factors. The solution concepts of classical cooperative games have to be
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redefined to take into account the restriction of the coalitional possibilities. Much effort has
been done in this direction (see for example the survey in [16] and the references therein).
In the framework of restricted cooperation, the Shapley value was defined for cooperative
games with precedence constraints by Faigle and Kern [12], and for cooperative games on
convex geometries by Bilbao and Edelman [3]. Recently, Faigle et al [11] have extended the
definition of the Shapley value to cooperative games on concept lattices and therefore for
general lattices.
The algorithmic aspects of solution concepts of games with restricted cooperation have not
yet been sufficiently developed to permit their use in applications. The focus in this paper
is on these algorithmic aspects. We address the issue of computing the Shapley value of a
cooperative game on a lattice of sets closed under intersection, given by an implicational
system Σ. From logic point of view, Σ is a Horn CNF, and the models of Σ are the
characteristic vectors of the feasible coalitions [2, 30]. The classical situation, where all the
subsets of N are feasible, occurs exactly when the implicational system is empty.
The complexity of computing the Shapley value of a game depends on how the input
is given. Faigle and Kern [12] have shown that if the game is given by an oracle then the
computation of the Shapley value is already exponential in the classical case. They have
also shown that, for games with restricted cooperation, computing the Shapley value is
#P -hard even for elementary games given explicitly. Their reduction is based on counting
the number of linear extensions of a poset, or minimal interval extensions when considering
the concept lattice.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we relate our work to previous contribu-
tions and introduce the model of cooperative games on implicational systems. In Section 3,
we define the problem of computing the Shapley value, decompose it into two sub-problems
and discuss its difficulty. In Section 4, we give two algorithms for computing the Shapley
value of cooperative games on implicational systems and discuss their complexity. In Sec-
tion 5, we study the case where the lattice of feasible coalitions is isomorphic to a product
of chains. We then show that when the chains are all of the same fixed length, we can
compute in polynomial time the Shapley value of weighted graph games.
2. Preliminaries and related work
An implicational system on a set N is a binary relation Σ ⊆ 2N × N . An implication
(A, i) ∈ Σ is denoted by A→ i.
Definition 1. Let Σ = {A1 → a1, ..., Am → am} be an implicational system on N and
X ⊆ N . The Σ-closure of X, denoted XΣ, is the smallest set containing X and satisfying:
∀1 ≤ j ≤ m,Aj ⊆ XΣ ⇒ aj ∈ XΣ.
The set FΣ = {XΣ, X ⊆ N} is a closure system (closed under intersection and con-
taining N). The elements of FΣ are referred to as Σ-closed sets. When ordered by in-
clusion, FΣ is a lattice denoted by LΣ = (FΣ,⊆). We will assume that ∅ ∈ FΣ, that
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is, ∀i ∈ N, ∅ → i 6∈ Σ. Notice that we can remove from Σ every implication A → i
with i ∈ A, without changing the lattice of feasible coalitions. Therefore, we will consider
only implications A → i with i 6∈ A. Figure 1 shows the lattice LΣ corresponding to the
implicational system Σ = {2→ 1, 4→ 3, 6→ 5} on N = {1, ..., 6}.
1 3 5
12 13 34 15 35 56
123 134 125 135 345 165 365
1234 1235 1345 1256 1356 3456
12345 12356 13456
123456
Figure 1: The lattice LΣ corresponding to Σ = {2→ 1, 4→ 3, 6→ 5} on N = {1, ..., 6}.
We define a cooperative game on an implicational system as a game with restricted co-
operation where the feasible coalitions are the closed sets of the given implicational system.
More formally:
Definition 2. A cooperative game on an implicational system is a triplet (N,Σ, v) where:
a) N is a finite set of players;
b) Σ is an implicational system on N ;
c) v is a mapping from FΣ to R such that: v(∅) = 0.
The mapping v assigns to every feasible coalition F ∈ FΣ its worth, that is, the gain that
the members of F can achieve by themselves, regardless of how the players not in F will act.
The notion of a conjuctive permission structure, introduced by Gilles et al [15] to model
situations where a player may need the permission of another player to participate in the
cooperative effort, can be translated to our framework, by restricting Σ as follows:
i→ j ∈ Σ⇔ i needs the permission of j to cooperate.
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The autonomous coalitions in [15] will then be the Σ-closed sets in our framework. The
idea of a conjunctive permission structure can even be generalized in our framework to
include the case where a subset A of players needs the presence of a player i in order to put
its cooperative possibilities into action. The player i acts then as a catalyst to the cooper-
ation of the players in A. This is simply achieved by setting A→ i ∈ Σ. Note however the
difference between games with a permission structure as defined in [15] and our games on
implicational systems which are games with restricted cooperation in the sense that only
feasible coalitions can form. In [15] all coalitions can form but only their feasible part is
able to generate worth. See [12] for more details on this point.
Many structural properties of the lattice LΣ can be deduced directly from the form of
the implicational system Σ. For instance we have the following proposition
Proposition 1. If |A| = 1 for all (A→ i) ∈ Σ, then LΣ is a distributive lattice.
Proof: Assume that |A| = 1 for all (A→ i) ∈ Σ, then Σ induces a permission structure S
on N , defined by S(i) = {j ∈ N | (j → i) ∈ Σ}. LΣ is then the collection of autonomous
coalitions derived by the conjunctive approach from the permission structure S, and hence,
is a distributive lattice. (See Definition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 in [9]).
Note that the converse statement is not valid as shown in the following example:
N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, Σ = {1→ 2, 3→ 4, 5→ 2, 5→ 4, 24→ 5}.
The lattice LΣ, depicted in figure 2, is distributive despite the fact that 24→ 5 ∈ Σ
2 4
12
245
34
1245 2345
12345
Figure 2: The lattice LΣ corresponding to Σ = {1→ 2, 3→ 4, 5→ 2, 5→ 4, 24→ 5} on N = {1, ..., 5}.
Our work goes in the same line as those of Faigle and Kern [12], Bilbao and Edelman
[3] and Faigle et al [11]. Cooperative games with precedence constraints, introduced in [12],
correspond in our framework to the case |A| = 1 for all (A → i) ∈ Σ. We consider coop-
erative games on closure systems as in [11], with the difference that the feasible coalitions
in our model are given by an implicational system Σ on a set of players N , instead of a
4
context as in [11]. We can shift from our representation to the representation of [11], in the
following way:
Let Σ be an implicational system. Consider the context K = (G,M, I) defined by G = N ,
M = {F ∈ FΣ | ∀F1, F2 ∈ FΣ, F 6= F1∩F2} and I = {(i, F ) ∈ G×M | i ∈ F}. The concept
lattice of K is isomorphic to LΣ. It is worth noticing, that these two representations are
incomparable. Indeed, the size of an implicational system Σ can be exponential in the size
of the associated context and vice-versa. For example, if we define the feasible coalitions to
be the cliques of a graph G = (N,E) then we need |N |2 implications in our representation,
whereas the size of a representation by a context is exponential. On the other side one
may need an exponential number of implications to represent the concepts of a context of
polynomial size [20]. It might be noteworthy that sometimes the exponential blow-up can
be avoided if auxiliary elements in N are allowed, as shown in [25].
3. Position of the problem
Let (N,Σ, v) be a cooperative game on an implicational system. Let Ch be the set of
maximal chains of the lattice LΣ = (FΣ,⊆). For a maximal chain c ∈ Ch and i ∈ N , we
denote by F (c, i) the last coalition in c that doesn’t contain the player i, and by F+(c, i)
the first coalition in c that contains the player i.
The coalition F+(c, i) always covers the coalition F (c, i) in the lattice LΣ, that is, there is
no coalition F in LΣ such that F (c, i) ( F ( F+(c, i).
The Shapley value of (N,Σ, v), as defined in [11], is the vector ϕ(v) = (ϕi(v))i∈N , where
ϕi(v) =
1
|Ch|
∑
c∈Ch
v(F+(c, i))− v(F (c, i))
|F+(c, i) \ F (c, i)|
. (1)
In this paper, we consider the following problem:
Shapley value
Input: A cooperative game (N,Σ, v).
Output: ϕ(v).
Define the set
Ai = {(F, F ′) ∈ F2Σ | ∃c ∈ Ch : F = F (c, i) and F ′ = F+(c, i)} .
Figure 3 shows the set A5 for Σ = {2 → 1, 4 → 3, 6 → 5} on N = {1, ..., 6}. For a
maximal chain c, the coalition F (c, 5) is linked to the coalition F+(c, 5) by a dotted line.
The elements of A5 can be identified with the dotted lines.
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1 3 5
12 13 34 15 35 56
123 134 125 135 345 165 365
1234 1235 1345 1256 1356 3456
12345 12356 13456
123456
Figure 3: The dotted lines correspond to the elements of A5.
For any F ∈ FΣ, we denote by Ch↓(F ) (resp. Ch↑(F )) the number of maximal chains of
the sublattice [∅, F ] (resp. [F,N ]). In Figure 3, we have Ch↓(135) = 6 and Ch↑(135) = 6.
With this notation, equation (1) becomes
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
∑
(F,F ′)∈Ai
Ch↓(F ) · Ch↑(F ′)
|F ′ \ F |
(v(F ′)− v(F )) . (2)
In view of the last expression, we can decompose the problem Shapley value into two
sub-problems, MarginSets and NChains:
MarginSets
Input: An implicational system Σ on the set of players N and i ∈ N .
Output: Enumerate the set Ai.
NChains
Input: An implicational system Σ on the set of players N and F ∈ FΣ.
Output: Ch↓(F ).
There exist output polynomial time algorithms to enumerate the set Ai for any given
implicational system Σ [4, 19, 23], but the size of Ai may be exponential e.g. for Σ = ∅, we
have |Ai| = 2|N |−1.
For general cooperative games, when the function v is given by an oracle, any algorithm
that solves Shapley value will list all the pairs in Ai. For particular games, one can obtain
a partition of the set Ai of polynomial size, where the elements of each equivalence class
have the same behaviour. This idea will be developed in Section 5.
6
The problemNChains consists in counting the number of maximal chains in the lattice
associated to the implicational system ΣF = {X → x | X ∪ {x} ⊆ F} on the set of players
F . Notice that Ch↑(F ) is obtained by solving the problem NChains with the arguments
F = N and Σ′ = Σ ∪ {∅ → j | j ∈ F}. Brightwell and Winkler [5] have shown that the
problemNChains is #P -Hard even for closure systems closed under union, i.e. distributive
lattices.
The next proposition is a rewriting of results in [12] we therefore omit its proof.
Proposition 2. [12] Assume that we have an oracle solving NChains. Then an algorithm
that solves Shapley value will execute a call for the oracle for each (F, F ′) ∈ Ai, i ∈ N .
Thus, solving Shapley value is at least as hard as solving NChains. In other words,
the complexity of NChains is a lower bound for the complexity of Shapley value even
for elementary games.
In order to solve efficiently the problem Shapley value, we must be able to solve the
problem NChains efficiently. This is, however, not sufficient. It may happen that we can
solve NChains efficiently and yet the problem Shapley value remains hard. This is due
to the interaction between the two sub-problems NChains and MarginSets.
In the next section, we give two algorithms for solving the problem Shapley value. The
first one enumerates the maximal chains of LΣ. The second one computes the lattice LΣ,
and then computes the Shapley value. In Section 5, we address the case where the lattice
LΣ is isomorphic to a product of chains.
4. Two algorithms for computing the Shapley value
In the following, we describe two algorithms for computing the Shapley value for any
cooperative game (N,Σ, v).
4.1. Enumeration of the maximal chains of LΣ
We will generate the maximal chains of the lattice LΣ in a classical backtracking manner,
i.e. given a partial chain C = (∅ = F0, . . . , Fj), for each feasible set F covering Fj we will
enumerate all the maximal chains having (∅ = F0, . . . , Fj , F ) as a prefix, starting from
C = (∅). Whenever F = N , then a maximal chain is obtained and thus we compute the
marginal contribution of each player in N with respect to this maximal chain.
For a family E of sets, We denote by Min⊆(E) the set of minimal elements of E with
respect to set inclusion. Lemma 1 shows how to compute a feasible coalition covering
another in the lattice LΣ. This lemma is not new, it can be found in earlier papers dealing
with the construction of the Galois or concept lattice of a context. See for example [4]. Our
contribution is to show how to compute a covering coalition using Σ as an input.
Lemma 1. F ′ covers F in LΣ iff F ′ ∈Min⊆{(F ∪ {i})Σ, i ∈ N \ F}.
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Proof: Suppose F ′ covers F and let j ∈ F ′\F . Then F ⊂ (F∪{j})Σ = F ′ otherwise F ′ does
not cover F . Now suppose there exists i ∈ N\F such that F ⊂ (F∪{i})Σ ⊂ (F∪{j})Σ = F ′.
This contradicts the fact that F ′ covers F , and thus F ′ ∈Min⊆{(F ∪ {i})Σ, i ∈ N \ F}.
Conversely suppose F ′ ∈Min⊆{(F ∪{i})Σ, i ∈ N \F}, with F ′ = (F ∪{j})Σ, j ∈ N \F
and F ′ does not cover F . Let F ⊂ F” ⊂ F ′ and i ∈ F” \ F . Then F ⊂ F” = (F ∪ {i})Σ ⊂
F ′ = (F ∪ {j})Σ which contradicts the fact that (F ∪ {j})Σ is minimal. 
Algorithm 1 Shapley −Main(N,Σ, v).
Data: A restricted cooperative game (N,Σ, v)
Result: (ϕi)i∈N
begin
for i← 1 to n do
ϕi ← 0
end
Shapley(∅, C = (∅));
end
Algorithm 2 Shapley((A,C)).
Result: (ϕi)i∈N
begin
if A = N then
{Let C = (∅ = F0, . . . , Fk = N)}
1 for j ← 1 to k do
for i ∈ Fj \ Fj−1 do
ϕi ← ϕi + v(Fj)−v(Fj−1)|Fj\Fj−1|
end
end
end
else
S = ∅;
for i ∈ N \A do
2 S = S ∪ {(A ∪ {i})Σ};
end
3 for F ∈Min⊆(S) do
Shapley(F,C + F );
end
end
end
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Proposition 3. Algorithm 1 computes the Shapley value in O(|N |3.|Σ|.|Ch|) time com-
plexity using polynomial space.
Proof: Algorithm 1 enumerates maximal chains recursively, and at each node A of the
execution tree, it computes the feasible coalitions covering A in the lattice using Lemma
1. For each leaf, the algorithm computes the marginal contributions associated to the
corresponding maximal chain (see Line 1 of Algorithm 2).
The complexity of Algorithm 2 is strongly related to the complexity of Line 2. Wild
[29] gives an algorithm for computing the closure of a set using an implicational sys-
tem in O(|N |2.|Σ|). Thus, the complexity for outputting a maximal chain is bounded
by O(|N |3.|Σ|), since the length of a chain is at most |N |. 
4.2. Building the lattice LΣ
The strategy here is first to compute the feasible coalitions lattice, and then compute
the Shapley value. There are several algorithms for computing the lattice [1, 4, 23] that are
already implemented in several platforms (e.g. Galicia or concepts explorer).
Algorithm 3 Procedure Shapley2(N,Σ, v).
Data: A restricted cooperative game (N,Σ, v)
Result: (ϕi)i∈N
begin
1 Compute the covering graph of the lattice LΣ = (FΣ,⊆);
2 For each F ∈ FΣ, compute Ch↓(F ) and Ch↑(F );
3 for (F, F ′) ∈ FΣ such that F ′ covers F do
for i ∈ F ′ \ F do
ϕi ← ϕi + v(F
′)−v(F )
|F ′\F |
end
end
end
Proposition 4. Algorithm 3 computes the Shapley value in O(|N |3.|Σ|.|FΣ|) time and
space complexity.
Proof: The complexity of the computation of the lattice based on an implicational system
can be easily derived from the complexity of algorithms in [1, 4, 23] and can be bounded by
O(|N |3.|Σ|.|FΣ|). The computation of Ch↓(F ) for every F ∈ FΣ can be done in O(|N |.|FΣ|)
using a breadth first search (BFS) of the covering graph of the lattice LΣ starting from the
bottom. The same argument applies to computing Ch↑(F ) starting from the top of the
lattice. The line 3 is simple search of the covering graph of the lattice LΣ, and for each
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edge the computation time is constant. Thus, the total complexity is bounded by the
computation of the lattice (line 1). 
Notice that whenever the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is polynomial then Algorithm
3 is also polynomial, since |Ch| ≥ |FΣ|N .
5. Weighted graph games on a product of chains
In this section, we restrict our attention to implicational systems which yield a collection
of feasible coalitions isomorphic to a product of chains. This situation occurs, for example,
in the model of multi-choice games introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan [17] and further
studied in [24]. The problem NChains can then be solved efficiently. The sets Ai, i ∈ N ,
will be partitioned into equivalence classes in such a way that we need only to consider one
element of each class in the computation of the Shapley value. If the number of classes is
polynomial, the Shapley value may be computed in polynomial time for specific classes of
games.
Let C1, . . . , Cm be disjoint finite sets. Assume that for each t in {1, . . . ,m}, Ct is totally
ordered by 4t. We thus have m disjoint totally ordered sets (C1,41), . . . (Cm,4m). The
size of a chain is defined as the number of its elements and the length of a chain is defined
as its size minus one. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the chains have
the same size l, and hence, the same length l− 1. See remark 2 at the end of the paper for
the case where the chains are not of the same length.
Let N =
m⋃
t=1
Ct and |N | = n. We define the partial order P = (N,4), called the parallel
sum of the chains (C1,41), . . . (Cm 4m), by
∀i, j ∈ N : i 4 j ⇔ ∃t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : i 4t j .
We associate with the partial order P the implicational system Σ on N defined by
Σ = {i→ j | i, j ∈ N, j 4 i} . (3)
An ideal of P is a subset I of P such that j ∈ I and i 4 j implies i ∈ I. Clearly
LΣ = (FΣ,⊆) is the lattice of ideals of P .
The product of the chains (C1,41), . . . (Cm 4m) is the partial order
(C1 × C2 × · · · × Cm,4prod) , where
(x1, x2, · · · , xm) 4prod (y1, y2, · · · , ym)⇔ xt 4t yt ∀t ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} . (4)
To see that the lattice LΣ = (FΣ,⊆) is isomorphic to a product of chains, observe that
any F ∈ LΣ is uniquely determined by the set
max(F ) = {i ∈ F | i 64 j ∀j ∈ F}.
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Indeed, we have
F = {i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ max(F ) : i 4 j}.
F ∈ LΣ can thus be identified with the m-tuple (i1, i2, · · · , im) where, for t = 1, 2, · · ·m, it
is the unique player in max(F )∩Ct if max(F )∩Ct 6= ∅, and it = rt with rt is an imaginary
player appended at the bottom of the chain (Ct,4t), if max(F ) ∩ Ct = ∅.
Letting (C ′t,4t) be the obtained chain after appending the player rt at the bottom of (Ct,4t
), the lattice LΣ = (FΣ,⊆) is isomorphic to the product of chains (C ′1×C ′2×· · ·×C ′m,4prod).
This fact is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider the three chains C1 : 1 41 2, C2 : 3 42 4 , C3 : 5 43 6. The
Hasse diagram of the partial order P is depicted in figure 4a. In figure 4b, we have added
an imaginary player at the bottom of each chain of P . The implicational system associated
with P is Σ = {2 → 1, 4 → 3, 6 → 5}. We have n = 6,m = 3, l = 2. The lattice LΣ is
depicted in figure 5a and is isomorphic to the product of chains (C ′1,41)×(C ′2,42)×(C ′3,43)
depicted in figure 5b.
1 3 5
2 4 6
(a) The partial order P .
1 3 5
2 4 6
r1 r2 r3
(b) The chains (C ′t,4t), t = 1, 2, 3.
Figure 4: Adding imaginary players at the bottom of each chain of P .
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∅
1 3 5
12 13 34 15 35 56
123 134 125 135 345 165 365
1234 1235 1345 1256 1356 3456
12345 12356 13456
123456
(a) The lattice LΣ.
(r1,r2,r3)
(1,r2,r3) (r1,3,r3) (r1,r2,5)
(2,r2,r3) (1,3,r3) (r1,4,r3) (1,r2,5) (r1,3,5) (r1,r2,6)
(2,3,r3) (1,4,r3)
(2,r2,5) (1,3,5) (r1,4,5) (1,r2,5) (r1,3,6)
(2,4,r3)
(2,3,5) (1,4,5) (2,r2,6) (1,3,6) (r1,4,6)
(2,4,5) (2,3,6) (1,3,6)
(2,4,6)
(b) (C ′1,41)× (C ′2,42)× (C ′3,43).
Figure 5: The lattice LΣ is isomorphic to the product (C′1,41)× (C′2,42)× (C′3,43).
For F ∈ FΣ, let P|F denote the restriction of the partial order P to the elements of F . For
i ∈ N , let h(i) = |{i}Σ| − 1, i.e. the number of players preceding i in the order P .
The fact that LΣ is the lattice of ideals of P enables us to give an alternative formulation
for the sets Ai, i ∈ N , where
Ai = {(F1, F2) ∈ F2Σ | ∃c ∈ Ch : F1 = F (c, i) and F2 = F+(c, i)}.
Proposition 5. Let i ∈ N and Σ defined as in (3). Then the elements of Ai are exactly
the pairs (F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}, F ∪ {i}Σ) where F ∈ FΣ with F ∩ C(i) = ∅.
Proof: As LΣ is the lattice of ideals of the order P , we know [28, p 291] that the coalitions
that cover a coalition F ∈ LΣ are just the coalitions F ∪ {j} where j is minimal in P \ F .
Thus for (F1, F2) ∈ Ai we have F2 = F1 ∪ {i} since F2 covers F1 and i ∈ F2 \ F1.
Since F1 = F2 \ {i} is an ideal of P , we necessarily have i ∈ max(F2). Thus F2 = F ∪ {i}Σ
where F is an ideal of P , hence F ∈ FΣ, with F ∩ C(i) = ∅. Consequently, (F1, F2) =
(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}, F ∪ {i}Σ).
Conversely, if (F1, F2) = (F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}, F ∪ {i}Σ) with F ∈ FΣ and F ∩C(i) = ∅ then
F2 covers F1 since i is minimal in P \ F1. In addition i ∈ F2 \ F1, then we can build a
maximal chain c in LΣ such that F1 = F (c, i) and F2 = F+(c, i). Hence (F1, F2) ∈ Ai. 
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In view of the last proposition, the elements (F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}, F ∪ {i}Σ) ∈ Ai can be
identified with those of the set:
Ãi = {F ∈ FΣ | F ∩ C(i) = ∅}.
We define an equivalence relation Ri on Ãi as follows:
F1RiF2 ⇔ P|F1 is isomorphic to P|F2 .
Let Qi be the quotient set of Ãi modulo Ri. We will denote the class of F ∈ Ãi by F .
Observe that all the elements of an equivalence class modulo Ri have the same cardinal,
since P|F1 isomorphic to P|F2 implies |F1| = |F2|, and that this common cardinal is an
integer in [0, n − l]. The next proposition gives an encoding of the class F , with |F | = k,
by a vector of integers in the set:
Dk = {(x0, . . . , xl) ∈ Nl+1, such that
l∑
t=0
xt = m− 1,
l∑
t=0
t · xt = k}.
We recall that m is the number of the disjoint chains in the order P and l is their common
size. In the rest of this paper, we denote the set
n−l⋃
k=0
Dk by E .
Proposition 6. Let i ∈ N . The sets Qi and E =
n−l⋃
k=0
Dk are in bijection by the mapping
ψ : Qi → E, F 7→ ψ(F ) = (x0, . . . , xl) where xt is the number of chains of size t in P|F for
1 ≤ t ≤ l, and x0 = m− 1−
l∑
t=1
xt.
Furthermore, we have ψ(F ) ∈ Dk with k = |F |.
Proof: Let F ∈ Qi and P|F the associated suborder of P . We will show that ψ(F ) ∈ E .
By construction, we have
l∑
t=1
xt ≤ m− 1, so we have x0 = m− 1−
l∑
t=1
xt ∈ N.
We have
l∑
t=0
t·xt = |F | and, as F ∈ Ãi, 0 ≤ |F | ≤ n−l. Thus, ψ(F ) ∈ Dk with k =
l∑
t=0
t·xt.
Now we will show that ψ is a bijection.
ψ is injective: Suppose ψ(F1) = ψ(F2) then P|F1 is isomorphic to P|F2 hence F1 = F2.
ψ is surjective: Let x = (x0, ..., xl) ∈ Dk, i.e.
l∑
t=0
xt = m − 1 and k =
l∑
t=0
t · xt. For
each j ∈ [1, l], take xj chains of size j. Define the poset PX as the parallel sum of all the
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defined chains. Since the number of chains in PX is at most m − 1 and the size of each
chain is bounded by l, then PX is isomorphic to a suborder P|F of P with F ∩ C(i) = ∅.
Thus ψ(F ) = x. 
Example 2. (Example 1 continued) For i = 5, as 5 ∈ C3, the elements of Ã5 are the
feasible coalitions F ∈ FΣ such that F ∩ C3 = ∅, that is, 5 6∈ F and 6 6∈ F :
Ã5 = {∅, {1}, {3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}};
The size of an element of Ã5 is between 0 and n − l = 6 − 2 = 4. The sets Dk for
k ∈ [0, 4] are:
D0 = {(2, 0, 0)}, D1 = {(1, 1, 0)}, D2 = {(0, 2, 0), (1, 0, 1)},
D3 = {(0, 1, 1)}, D4 = {(0, 0, 2)}.
And:
E =
4⋃
k=0
Dk = {(2, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 2)}.
The set D2 contains two codes which correspond to two equivalence classes modulo R5.
These two classes contain coalitions of size k = 2. The class associated with the code (0, 2, 0)
contains feasible coalitions that are built by taking exactly one player from two distinct chains
not containing the player 5. The only such coalition is {1, 3}. The class associated with the
code (1, 0, 1) contains feasible coalitions that are built by discarding one chain (the 1 in the
first position), never taking only one player from a chain (the zero in the second position),
and taking two players in a given chain, that doesn’t contain the player 5. The feasible
coalitions that satisfy this pattern are {1, 2} and {3, 4}. Indeed we have {1, 2} R5 {3, 4}.
We can see also that {1, 2, 3} R5 {1, 4, 3} and the two coalitions share the code (0, 1, 1) ∈ D3.

Let x ∈ E and denote by Axi the equivalence class ψ−1(x), where ψ is the bijection
defined in proposition 6. By Proposition 5, we have |F \F ′| = 1 for all (F, F ′) ∈ Ai. Thus,
equation (2) can be rewritten as:
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
F∈Axi
Ch↓(F∪{i}Σ\{i})·Ch↑(F∪{i}Σ)·
(
v(F ∪ {i}Σ)− v(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i})
)
.
(5)
The following lemma states that Ch↓(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F ∪ {i}Σ) depends only on
the class of F .
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Lemma 2. Let all the chains in P have the same length and x ∈ E. Then for all F1, F2 ∈
Axi , we have:
Ch↓(F1 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F1 ∪ {i}Σ) = Ch↓(F2 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F2 ∪ {i}Σ).
Proof:
Let x ∈ E and F1, F2 ∈ Axi . Recall that for any F ∈ FΣ, Ch↓(F ) is the number of linear
extensions of P|F and Ch↑(F ) is the number of linear extensions of P|N\F .
Since P|F1 is isomorphic to P|F2 , then P|F1∪{i}Σ\{i} is isomorphic to P|F2∪{i}Σ\{i}. There-
fore, we have:
Ch↓(F1 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) = Ch↓(F2 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}).
On the other hand, since all the chains are of the same length, then P|N\[F1∪{i}Σ\{i}] is
isomorphic to P|N\[F2∪{i}Σ\{i}]. Therefore, we also have:
Ch↑(F1 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) = Ch↑(F2 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}).
Hence, we have:
Ch↓(F1 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F1 ∪ {i}Σ) = Ch↓(F2 ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F2 ∪ {i}Σ). 
Thus, we can associate with each class Axi the nonnegative integer
αx = Ch
↓(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) · Ch↑(F ∪ {i}Σ)
with F being any coalition in Axi . The following lemma gives a formula for αx.
Lemma 3. Let x ∈ E and k =
l∑
t=0
t · xt. We have
αx =
(k + h(i))! · (n− k − h(i)− 1)!
h(i)! · (l − h(i)− 1)! ·
l∏
t=0
[t! · (l − t)!]xt
.
Proof: Let x ∈ E with k =
l∑
t=0
t ·xt and F ∈ Axi . Let F ′ = F ∪{i}Σ\{i} and pj = |F ′∩Cj |,
j = 1, . . .m, where Cj is a chain of P .
Ch↓(F ′) is the number of linear extensions of P|F ′ which is the parallel sum of disjoint
chains of sizes pj j = 1, . . .m. Thus, we have [22]: Ch↓(F ′) =
|F ′|!
m∏
j=1
pj !
.
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In the same way, we obtain: Ch↑(F ∪ {i}Σ)) = Ch↑(F ′ ∪ {i}) = (n−|F
′|−1)!·(l−h(i))
m∏
j=1
(l−pj)!
.
It follows that Ch↓(F ′) · Ch↑(F ′ ∪ {i}) = |F
′|!·(n−|F ′|−1)!·(l−h(i))
m∏
j=1
pj !·(l−pj)!
.
For t = 0, 1 . . . , l, t 6= h(i), the number of chains Cj such that pj = t is xt. The number
of chains Cj such that pj = h(i) is xh(i) + 1. Thus,
Ch↓(F ′) · Ch↑(F ′ ∪ {i} = |F
′|! · (n− |F ′| − 1)! · (l − h(i))
l∏
t=0
[t! · (l − t)!]xt · h(i)! · (l − h(i))!
.
Finally, observing that |F ′| = k + h(i), we get: αx = (k+h(i))!·(n−k−h(i)−1)!l∏
t=0
[t!·(l−t)!]xt ·h(i)!·(l−h(i)−1)!
. 
Now we can rewrite equation (5) using αx as follows:
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
αx ·
∑
F∈Axi
(
v(F ∪ {i}Σ)− v(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i})
)
. (6)
In order to compute ϕi(v) using (6), we need to enumerate, for k = 0, . . . , n − l, all the
elements of Dk. Now, we describe a backtracking algorithm to enumerate all the encodings
x = (x0, ..., xl) ∈ Nl+1 in Dk. At a depth j, we suppose that all the entries xl, ..., xj−1 have
already been filled. The remaining values m′ = m − 1 −
l∑
t=j−1
xt and k′ = k −
l∑
t=j−1
t · xt
will be decomposed on x0, ..., xj if k′ ≤ j.m′, otherwise there is no possible completion of
the vector x. Whenever k′ = 0 the only solution is to put all the remaining chains in x0.
The first call to Algorithm 4 is Gen-Class(l, k,m− 1) with 0 ≤ k ≤ l.(m− 1).
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Algorithm 4 Gen-Class(j, k,m).
begin
if k = 0 then
x0 = m; Output x;
end
else
1 for i = bkj c to 0 do
xj = i;
k′ = k − i.j;
m′ = m− i;
if k′ ≤ (j − 1).m′ then
Gen-Class(j − 1, k′,m′);
end
end
end
end
Proposition 7. Let k be an integer in [0, n − l]. Algorithm 4 generates all the vectors in
Dk in O(k.l.|Dk|) using polynomial space.
Proof: First, we will show by induction on the integer j ∈ [1, l], that all the vectors
x = (x0, . . . , xl) generated by Gen-Class(j, k,m−1) satisfy
j∑
t=0
txt = k and
j∑
t=0
xt = m−1
and therefore belong to Dk.
For j = 1, the algorithm generates a unique vector x with x0 = m− 1− k and x1 = k
and all other entires are null, which satisfies
j∑
t=0
txt = k and
j∑
t=0
xt = m− 1.
Suppose now that every vector x, generated by Gen-Class(j′, k′,m′), where 1 ≤ j′ < j,
is correct. The call Gen-Class(j, k,m− 1) will do the following affectations:
xj = i, k
′ = k − ij, m′ = m− 1− i
and then call Gen-Class(j − 1, k′,m′). By the induction hypothesis, any output x of
Gen-Class(j − 1, k′,m′) satisfies:
j−1∑
t=0
txt = k
′ and
j−1∑
t=0
xt = m
′.
Thus, we have
j∑
t=0
txt = k
′+ jxj = k− ij+ ji = k and
j∑
t=0
xt = m
′+xj = m−1− i+ i =
m − 1. Thus, for all j ∈ [1, l], the vectors x generated by Gen-Class(j, k,m − 1) satisfy
j∑
t=0
txt = k and
j∑
t=0
xt = m− 1. For j = l, we obtain
l∑
t=0
txt = k and
l∑
t=0
xt = m− 1 that is,
x ∈ Dk.
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Now, we will show that if a = (a0, . . . , al) ∈ Dk, then a is generated by Algorithm 4
with the input (l, k,m − 1). First, note that, the values of xl generated by the algorithm
are the integers between 0 and bkl c. Since a ∈ Dk, we have k =
l∑
t=0
t ·at and kl = al+
l−1∑
t=0
t·at
l .
Therefore al ≤ bkl c and the element al will be generated by the algorithm. Next, sup-
pose that the partial solution (aj+1, . . . al) has already been generated. Then Algorithm 4
will be called with the arguments (j,
j∑
t=0
t · at,m − 1 −
l∑
t=j+1
at). The values xj generated
by the algorithm are the integers between 0 and b
j∑
t=0
t·at
j c. Since aj ≤ b
j∑
t=0
t·at
j c, the partial
solution (aj , aj+1, . . . al) will be generated. Once the sequence (a1, . . . , al) generated, the
algorithm will generate a0 by a0 = m − 1 −
l∑
t=1
at. Thus the solution a will be generated
by the algorithm.
Each call of the algorithm will cost O(k) (see Line 1), and the depth of the execution
tree is bounded by l the size of the vector. Thus the total cost of the algorithm is bounded
by O(k.l.|Dk|), since each call has a leaf which is a solution.
The space used by the algorithm corresponds to a chain from the root to a leaf and is
bounded by O(l). 
Proposition 8. We have |Dk| ∈ O(kl).
Proof: The elements of Dk correspond to the leaves of the search tree of Algorithm 4. The
depth of the tree is l and its branching factor is bounded by O(k). Thus |Dk| ∈ O(kl). 
Observe however, that even if we can enumerate efficiently all the elements of Dk for
k = 0, . . . n − l, and we have a formula for each αx, computing the Shapley value using
Equation (6) remains hard for general v. Indeed, if v is given by an oracle, we must execute
at least |Axi | calls to the oracle in order to compute v(F ∪ {i}Σ) − v(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) for
each F ∈ Axi . In the following, we will consider particular games on a product of chains for
which the computation can be carried efficiently.
The model of weighted graph games captures the interactions between pairs of players.
This is done by considering an undirected graph G = (N,E) with an integer weight vij
for each edge {i, j} ∈ E. A positive vij means that there are synergies between the two
players, and a negative one that the presence of both players in a coalition will decrease its
worth, because of, for instance, a conflict between i and j. We define a cooperative game
(N,Σ, v) by:
v(S) =
∑
{i,j}⊆S
vij ∀S ∈ FΣ.
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When Σ = ∅, we recover the classical weighted graph games studied by Deng and
Papadimitriou [8] who gave a simple formula for computing the Shapley value of these
games. We will show that the computation of the Shapley value remains easy when the
lattice of feasible coalitions is isomorphic to a product of chains with the same fixed length.
Proposition 9. Let (N,Σ, v) be a weighted graph game and i ∈ N . We have,
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
j 6=i
βxij · αx · vij , where βxij = |{F ∈ Axi | j ∈ F ∪ {i}Σ}|.
Proof: Let i ∈ N and F ∈ Ai. We have
v(F ∪ {i}Σ)− v(F ∪ {i}Σ \ {i}) =
∑
j∈F∪{i}Σ\{i}
vij .
Thus, (6) becomes ϕi(v) = 1Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
F∈Axi
(
αx ·
∑
j∈F∪{i}Σ\{i}
vij
)
, which can be rewrit-
ten as:
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
j 6=i
∑
F∈Axi ,
j∈F∪{i}Σ
αx · vij
Finally, we obtain:
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
j 6=i
βxij · αx · vij

Example 3. (Example 1 continued)
Let i = 5, j = 1 and x = (0, 1, 1). We have Axi = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 3}} and βxij = 2 since the
two coalitions in Axi contain the player 1.
The next proposition gives a formula for βxij :
Lemma 4. Let i 6= j ∈ N and x ∈ E. Then
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βxij =

0, if j → i,
(m− 1)!
l∏
t=0
xt!
, if i→ j,
(m− 2)!
l∏
t=0
xt!
·
l∑
t=h(j)+1
xt, otherwise.
Proof: Recall that the number of partitions of a set X, with |X| = n to parts X0, . . . , Xl,
such that |Xt| = xt, with
l∑
t=0
xt = n is given by the multinomial coefficient [7, p. 27]:
(
n
x0, . . . , xl
)
=
n!
l∏
t=0
xt!
. (7)
We will distinguish 3 cases according to whether i and j are comparable in P or not.
1. j → i, i.e. i is below j in a chain. Then, j 6∈ F ∪ {i}Σ for any F ∈ Axi , hence βxij = 0.
2. i → j, i.e. j is below i in a chain. Then, j ∈ F ∪ {i}Σ for all F ∈ Axi . Hence, we
have:
βxij = |Axi | =
(
m− 1
x0, . . . , xl
)
=
(m− 1)!
l∏
t=0
xt!
.
3. i 9 j and j 9 i, i.e. i and j are not in the same chain. Let θj be the height of
the maximal element of F ∈ Axi which is in the same chain as j. For a given θj , the
choice of F amounts at partitioning the m− 2 chains not containing neither i nor j,
to sets X0, . . . , Xl with |Xt| = x′t, where
x′t =
{
xt − 1 if t = θj + 1
xt otherwise.
(8)
Since θj can take all the integer values in the interval [h(j), l − 1], we have:
βxij =
∑
h(j)≤θj≤l−1
(
m− 2
x′0, . . . , x
′
l
)
, where
(
m− 2
x′0, . . . , x
′
l
)
= (m−2)!
l∏
t=0
x′t!
=
(m−2)!·xθj+1
l∏
t=0
xt!
.
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Therefore, βxij =
∑
h(j)≤θj≤l−1
(m−2)!·xθj+1
l∏
t=0
xt!
= (m−2)!
l∏
t=0
xt!
·
∑
h(j)≤θj≤l−1
xθj+1
We can rewrite the last equation as: βxij =
(m−2)!
l∏
t=0
xt!
·
l∑
t=h(j)+1
xt.

Theorem 1. The Shapley value ϕi of a player i in a weighted graph game on a product of
m chains with the same length l− 1 can be computed in O(nl+3), where n is the number of
players. For fixed l, it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof:
Let P be the sum of m disjoint chains of length l − 1 and i ∈ N , where N is the set of
all the elements of the m chains. Let |N | = n. From Proposition 9, the Shapley value can
be computed using the formula:
ϕi(v) =
1
Ch↓(N)
n−l∑
k=0
∑
x∈Dk
∑
j 6=i
βxij · αx · vij , where βxij = |{F ∈ Axi | j ∈ F ∪ {i}Σ}|.
According to [22], the number of linear extensions Ch↓(N) of P is Ch↓(N) = n!(l!)m ,
thus Ch↓(N) can be computed in O(n+m) = O(n) since n ≤ m. From Proposition 7, the
equivalence classes in Dk can be generated in O(k.l.|Dk|) for k ∈ [0, n − 1]. Proposition 8
shows that the number of equivalence classes in Dk is bounded by O(kl). Using Lemma 3
and Lemma 4, for each each equivalence class in Dk corresponding to Axi , we compute both
αx and βxij in O(n). Thus the total complexity is bounded by O(n
l+3).
When l is fixed, then O(nl+3) is a polynomial and therefore the total time complexity
is bounded by a polynomial.

Remark 1. When Theorem 1 is restricted to classical graph games, i.e. m = n and l = 1,
we obtain the complexity O(n4) which is larger than O(n), the complexity obtained in [8]
for each player. Indeed, for a classical graph game, the lattice is boolean and has several
properties that cannot be exploited for the general case. The difficult in our case is the
number of equivalence classes and how to compute them, whereas, for the boolean lattice,
there are n− 1 classes and this fact leads to a simplification of the formula.
Remark 2. If the chains are not of the same length, we define the relation Ri as follows:
F1RiF2 ⇔
(
P|F1
∼= P|F2 and P|N\F1 ∼= P|N\F2
)
. (9)
Each class modulo Ri will be coded by two l-tuples of nonnegative integers, where l is the
maximal size of the chains. Ch↓(F ∪{i}Σ \{i}) ·Ch↑(F ∪{i}Σ) will be constant within each
class and the number of classes corresponding to a cardinality k of the class elements will
be bounded by a polynomial in k for constant l.
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6. Concluding remarks
We have addressed in this paper the issue of computing the Shapley value of a cooper-
ative game on a lattice given by an implicational system. The structural properties of the
lattice LΣ of feasible coalitions play an important role in the design of efficient algorithms.
Indeed, efficient algorithms for the computation of the Shapley value are likely to exist
only on lattices for which the computation of the number of maximal chains traversing any
element of the lattice can be done efficiently, since this computation is a prerequisite for the
computation of the Shapley value. A lattice isomorphic to a product of chains is one such
structure treated in this paper. There exist distributive lattices for which Nchains can be
solved efficiently. For example, the lattices of ideals of series-parallel orders [22], or N -free
orders with activity bounded by a constant [13]. An interesting issue to be addressed,
would be whether the Shapley value can be computed efficiently for weighted graph games
on these lattices.
When no efficient algorithm for computing the Shapley value is likely to exist, approx-
imation becomes in order. When the lattice of feasible coalitions is distributive, approx-
imating the number of maximal chains traversing an element of the lattice, amounts to
approximate the number of linear extensions of a partial order. Methods have been pro-
posed to deal with this issue, [5, 10, 6]. One may think also of reducing the number of
coalitions considered in computing the Shapley value, following an idea used in [26] in
searching for an optimal coalition structure. Of course, the quality of the approximation,
will depend on the choice of the coalitions taken into consideration.
As presented in this paper, the model of cooperative games on implicational systems
generalizes the notion of a conjunctive permission structure. We think that this model can
be extended to involve disjunctive permission structures, and many other constraints on
coalition formation, by allowing for implications with "negated" players. For example the
implication 1 2 3 → 4 will mean that the absence of players 1, 2 and 3 in a coalition will
result in the absence of player 4, and the implication 1 2 3→ 4 will mean that the presence
of player 2 in a coalition where the players 1 and 3 are absent, will entail the presence of
player 4.
Another issue is the study of the algorithmic aspects of other solution concepts for co-
operative games on lattices such as the core.
Acknowledgment: The authors wish to thank anonymous referees for their suggestions
which have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. This work has been funded by
the CMEP Tassili 15MDU944-2015-2018 and the ANR project Graphen 2015-2019. The
first author has received a scholarship from the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and
Scientific Research.
22
References
[1] Baixeries, J., Szathmary, L., Valtchev, P., and Godin, R. (2009). Yet a faster algorithm
for building the hasse diagram of a concept lattice. In Formal Concept Analysis, 7th Inter-
national Conference, ICFCA 2009, Darmstadt, Germany, May 21-24, 2009, Proceedings,
pages 162–177.
[2] Bertet, K. and Monjardet, B. (2010). The multiple facets of the canonical direct unit
implicational basis. Theor. Comput. Sci., 411(22-24):2155–2166.
[3] Bilbao, J. M. and Edelman, P. H. (2000). The shapley value on convex geometries.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 103(1-3):33–40.
[4] Bordat, J.-P. (1986). Calcul pratique du treillis de galois d’une correspondance. Math.
Sci. Hum., 96(5-6):31–47.
[5] Brightwell, G. and Winkler, P. (1991). Counting linear extensions. Order, 8(3):225–242.
[6] Bubley, R. and Dyer, M. (1999). Faster random generation of linear extensions. Discrete
Mathematics, 201(1-3):81–88.
[7] Comtet, L. (1974). Advanced Combinatorics. The art of finite and infinite expansions.
D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland.
[8] Deng, X. and Papadimitriou, C. H. (1994). On the complexity of cooperative solution
concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2):257–266.
[9] Derks, J. and Gilles, R. (1995). Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on
coalition formation. International Journal of Game Theory, 24(2):147–163.
[10] Ewacha, K., Rival, I., and Zaguia, N. (1997). Approximating the number of linear
extensions. Theoretical Computer Science, 175(2):271–282.
[11] Faigle, U., Grabisch, M., Jiménez-Losada, A., and Ordóñez, M. (2016). Games on
concept lattices: Shapley value and core. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 198:29–47.
[12] Faigle, U. and Kern, W. (1992). The shapley value for cooperative games under prece-
dence constraints. International Journal of Game Theory, 21(3):249–266.
[13] Felsner, S. and Manneville, T. (2014). Linear extensions of N-free orders. Order,
32(2):147–155.
[14] Garg, V. K., Narahari, Y., and Narasimha Murty, M. (2013). Novel biobjective clus-
tering (bigc) based on cooperative game theory. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE
Transactions on, 25(5):1070–1082.
23
[15] Gilles, R. P., Owen, G., and Brink, R. (1992). Games with permission structures: The
conjunctive approach. International Journal of Game Theory, 20(3):277–293.
[16] Grabisch, M. (2013). The core of games on ordered structures and graphs. Annals of
Operations Research, 204(1):33–64.
[17] Hsiao, C.-R. and Raghavan, T. (1993). Shapley value for multichoice cooperative
games, I. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(2):240–256.
[18] Kollias, K. and Roughgarden, T. (2011). Restoring pure equilibria to weighted con-
gestion games. Automata, Languages and Programming: 38th International Colloquium,
ICALP 2011, Zurich, Switzerland, July 4-8, 2011, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pages
539–551.
[19] Kuznetsov, S. O. and Obiedkov, S. A. (2001). Algorithms for the construction of
concept lattices and their diagram graphs. In Principles of Data Mining and Knowledge
Discovery, 5th European Conference, PKDD 2001, Freiburg, Germany, September 3-5,
2001, Proceedings, pages 289–300.
[20] Mannila, H. and Räihä, K.-J. (1992). On the complexity of inferring functional depen-
dencies. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 40(2):237–243.
[21] Michalak, T. P., Aadithya, K. V., Szczepanski, P. L., Ravindran, B., and Jennings,
N. R. (2013). Efficient computation of the shapley value for game-theoretic network
centrality. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 46:607–650.
[22] Möhring, R. H. (1989). Computationally tractable classes of ordered sets. In Algorithms
and Order (Ivan Rival edition), Springer Netherlands, pages 105–193.
[23] Nourine, L. and Raynaud, O. (1999). A fast algorithm for building lattices. Inf.
Process. Lett., 71(5-6):199–204.
[24] Nouweland, A., Tijs, S., Potters, J., and Zarzuelo, J. (1995). Cores and related solution
concepts for multi-choice games. Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 41(3):289–311.
[25] Rudolph, S. (2017). Succinctness and tractability of closure operator representations.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 658:327–345.
[26] Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., and Tohmé, F. (1999). Coali-
tion structure generation with worst case guarantees. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-2):209–
238.
[27] Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker,
A. W., editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM 28), volume II of Annals of
Mathematics Studies., pages 307–317. Princeton University Press.
24
[28] Stanley, R. P. (2011). Enumerative Combinatorics: Volume 1. Cambridge University
Press, New York, NY, USA, 2nd edition.
[29] Wild, M. (1995). Computations with finite closure systems and implications. In Com-
puting and Combinatorics, First Annual International Conference, COCOON ’95, Xi’an,
China, August 24-26, 1995, Proceedings, pages 111–120.
[30] Wild, M. (2017). The joy of implications, aka pure horn formulas: Mainly a survey.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 658:264–292.
25
Appendix A. Computing the Shapley value using the Harsanyi dividends
We explore the use of Harsanyi dividends and their recurrence formula in the compu-
tation of the Shapley value.
Following [12], we define for all T ∈ FΣ, T 6= ∅, the T -simple game uT : FΣ → R: by
uT (S) =
{
1 if T ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
When FΣ = 2N , uT is known as the T -unanimity game.
The family {uT , T ∈ FΣ \∅} is a basis of the vector space of all cooperative games defined
on FΣ. Hence, each game v : FΣ → R can be expressed uniquely as a linear combination
of the games uT :
v =
∑
T∈FΣ\∅
∆vT · uT . (A.1)
That is,
∀S ∈ FΣ, v(S) =
∑
T∈FΣ\∅
∆vT · uT (S). (A.2)
In view of the definition of the simple games uT , the last equation becomes
∀S ∈ FΣ, v(S) =
∑
T∈FΣ\∅,T⊆S
∆vT . (A.3)
The real coefficient ∆vT is called the Harsanyi dividend of the coalition T in the game
v.
Letting ∆v∅ = 0, Equation (A.3) yields the following recurrence formula for the dividends
∆vT , T ∈ FΣ.
∆vT =

0 if T = ∅,
v(T )−
∑
S∈FΣ,S⊂T
∆vS otherwise.
Using this recurrence formula to compute the dividends ∆vT is not efficient from the algo-
rithmic point of view, since, to compute ∆vT , we have to compute all the ∆
v
S ’s, where S ⊂ T
is a feasible coalition.
We now turn to the evaluation of the Shapley value ϕi(uT ) of the player i ∈ N in the
simple game uT . Let us recall the definition of the hierarchical strength hT (i) of player i
in the feasible coalition T [12]. A feasible ranking of the players in N is a linear extension
of the order P . i ∈ T is T -maximal in the ranking π, if i is maximal in the linear order
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induced by π on T . Let R(N) be the set of all feasible rankings of N . The hierarchical
strength hT (i) of player i in the feasible coalition T is then defined by:
hT (i) =
1
|R(N)|
· |{π ∈ R(N) | i is T -maximal in π}|. (A.4)
Let hT =
∑
i∈T
hT (i). Then, the Shapley value of i ∈ N in the game uT is given by [12]:
ϕi(uT ) =

hT (i)
hT
, if i ∈ T,
0 , otherwise.
Using Lemma 4 in [12], which states that hT (i) 6= 0 if and only if i ∈ max(T ), we obtain:
ϕi(uT ) =

hT (i)
hT
, if i ∈ max(T ),
0 , otherwise.
Then, by the linearity of the Shapley value and Equation (A.1), we have:
ϕi(v) =
∑
T∈FΣ,i∈max(T )
hT (i)
hT
·∆vT . (A.5)
In the case studied in Section 5, (FΣ,⊆) is the lattice of ideals of a partial order P .
Then, an explicit expression of the dividend ∆vT can be obtained from Equation (A.3), using
the Möbius inversion formula [28]:
∆vT =
∑
S∈FΣ
µ(S, T ) · v(S). (A.6)
where µ is the Möbius function of the lattice (FΣ,⊆). As (FΣ,⊆) is the lattice of ideals of
the partial order P , we know [28] that
µ(S, T ) =

(−1)|T |−|S| , if S ⊆ T and T \ S is an antichain of P ,
0 , otherwise.
The condition S ⊆ T and T \ S is an antichain of P is equivalent to S = T \ E, where
E is a subset of max(T ). We thus obtain the following expression for the dividend ∆vT :
∆vT =
∑
E⊆max(T )
(−1)|E| · v(T \ E). (A.7)
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The Shapley value of player i ϕi(v), given by Equation (A.5), becomes then
ϕi(v) =
∑
T∈FΣ,i∈max(T )
hT (i)
hT
·
∑
E⊆max(T )
(−1)|E| · v(T \ E). (A.8)
Again, the direct use of Equation (A.8) to compute the Shapley value is not efficient
from the computational point of view. Indeed, we have to generate all the coalitions T ∈ FΣ
with i ∈ max(T ) and all the subsets E of max T .
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